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Abstract
In set-system auctions, there are several overlapping teams of agents, and a task that can
be completed by any of these teams. The buyer’s goal is to hire a team and pay as little as
possible. Recently, Karlin, Kempe and Tamir introduced a new definition of frugality ratio for
this setting. Informally, the frugality ratio is the ratio of the total payment of a mechanism to
perceived fair cost. In this paper, we study this together with alternative notions of fair cost,
and how the resulting frugality ratios relate to each other for various kinds of set systems.
We propose a new truthful polynomial-time auction for the vertex cover problem (where the
feasible sets correspond to the vertex covers of a given graph), based on the local ratio algorithm
of Bar-Yehuda and Even. The mechanism guarantees to find a winning set whose cost is at most
twice the optimal. In this situation, even though it is NP-hard to find a lowest-cost feasible
set, we show that local optimality of a solution can be used to derive frugality bounds that are
within a constant factor of best possible. To prove this result, we use our alternative notions of
frugality via a bootstrapping technique, which may be of independent interest.
∗This research is supported by the EPSRC research grants “Algorithmics of Network-sharing Games” and “Dis-
continuous Behaviour in the Complexity of randomized Algorithms”.
1 Introduction
The situations where one has to hire a team of agents to perform a task are quite typical in many
domains. In a market-based environment, this goal can be achieved by means of a (combinatorial)
procurement auction: the agents submit their bids and the buyer selects a team based on the
agents’ ability to work with each other as well as their payment requirements. The problem is
complicated by the fact that only some subsets of agents constitute a valid team: the task may
require several skills, and each agent may possess only a subset of these skills, the agents must
be able to communicate with each other, etc. Also, for each agent there is a cost associated with
performing the task. This cost is known to the agent himself, but not to the buyer or other agents.
A well-known example of this setting is a shortest path auction, where the buyer wants to
purchase connectivity between two points in a network that consists of independent subnetworks.
In this case, the valid teams are sets of links that contain a path between these two points. This
problem has been studied extensively in the recent literature starting with the seminal paper by
Nisan and Ronen [17] (see also [1, 10, 9, 7, 15, 8, 20]). Generally, problems in this category can be
formalized by specifying (explicitly or implicitly) the sets of agents capable of performing the tasks,
or feasible sets. Consequently, the auctions of this type are sometimes referred to as set system
auctions.
The buyer and the agents have conflicting goals: the buyer wants to spend as little money as
possible, and the agents want to maximise their earnings. Therefore, to ensure truthful bidding,
the buyer has to use a carefully designed payment scheme. While it is possible to use the celebrated
VCG mechanism [22, 4, 14] for this purpose, it suffers from two drawbacks. First, to use VCG, the
buyer always has to choose a cheapest feasible set. If the problem of finding a cheapest feasible
set is computationally hard, this may require exponential computational effort. One may hope to
use approximation algorithms to mitigate this problem: the buyer may be satisfied with a feasible
set whose cost is close to optimal and for many NP-hard problems there exist fast algorithms for
finding approximately optimal solutions. However, generally speaking, one cannot combine such
algorithms with VCG-style payments and preserve truthfulness [18]. The second issue with VCG is
that it has to pay a bonus to each agent in the winning team. As a result, the total VCG payment
may greatly exceed the true cost of a cheapest feasible set. In fact, one can easily construct an
example where this is indeed the case. While the true cost of a cheapest feasible set is not necessarily
a realistic benchmark for a truthful mechanism, it turns out that VCG performs quite badly with
respect to more natural benchmarks discussed later in the paper. Therefore, a natural question
to ask is whether one can design truthful mechnisms and reasonable benchmarks for a given set
system such that these mechanisms perform well with respect to these benchmarks.
This issue was first raised by Nisan and Ronen [17]. It was subsequently addressed by Archer
and Tardos [1], who introduced the concept of frugality in the context of shortest path auctions.
The paper [1] proposes to measure the overpayment of a mechanism by the worst-case ratio between
its total payment and the cost of the cheapest path that is disjoint from the path selected by the
mechanism; this quantity is called the frugality ratio. The authors show that for a large class of
truthful mechanisms for this problem (which includes VCG and all mechanisms that satisfy certain
natural properties) the frugality ratio is n, where n is the number of edges in the shortest path.
Subsequently, Elkind et al. [9] showed that a somewhat weaker bound of n/2 holds for all truthful
shortest path auctions. Talwar [21] extends the definition of frugality ratio given in [1] to general
set systems, and studies the frugality ratio of the VCG mechanism for many specific set systems,
such as minimum spanning trees or set covers.
While the definition of frugality ratio proposed by [1] is well-motivated and has been instru-
mental in studying truthful mechanisms for set systems, it is not completely satisfactory. Consider,
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Figure 1: The diamond graph
for example, the graph of Figure 1 with the costs cAB = cBC = cCD = 0, cAC = cBD = 1. This
graph is 2-connected and the VCG payment to the winning path ABCD is bounded. However, the
graph contains no A–D path that is disjoint from ABCD, and hence the frugality ratio of VCG on
this graph remains undefined. At the same time, there is no monopoly, that is, there is no vendor
that appears in all feasible sets. In auctions for other types of set systems, the requirement that
there exist a feasible solution disjoint from the selected one is even more severe: for example, for
vertex-cover auctions (where vendors correspond to the vertices of some underlying graph, and the
feasible sets are vertex covers) the requirement means that the graph must be bipartite. To deal
with this problem, Karlin et al. [16] suggest a better benchmark, which is defined for any monopoly-
free set system. This quantity, which they denote by ν, intuitively corresponds to the total payoff
in a cheapest Nash equilibrium of a first-price auction. Based on this new definition, the authors
construct new mechanisms for the shortest path problem and show that the overpayment of these
mechanisms is within a constant factor of optimal.
1.1 Our results
Vertex cover auctions We propose a truthful polynomial-time auction for vertex cover that
outputs a solution whose cost is within a factor of 2 of optimal, and whose frugality ratio is at
most 2∆, where ∆ is the maximum degree of the graph (Theorem 16). We complement this result
by proving (Theorem 21) that for any ∆, there are graphs of maximum degree ∆ for which any
truthful mechanism has frugality ratio at least ∆/2. This means that both the solution quality and
the frugality ratio of our auction are within a constant factor of optimal. In particular, the frugality
ratio is within a factor of 4 of optimal. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first auction for this
problem that enjoys these properties. Moreover, we show how to transform any truthful mechanism
for the vertex-cover problem into a frugal one while preserving the approximation ratio.
Frugality ratios Our vertex cover results naturally suggest two modifications of the definition of
ν in [16]. These modifications can be made independently of each other, resulting in four different
payment bounds that we denote as TUmax, TUmin, NTUmax, and NTUmin, where NTUmin is
equal to the original payment bound ν of in [16]. All four payment bounds arise as Nash equilibria of
certain games (see Appendix); the differences between them can be seen as “the price of initiative”
and “the price of co-operation” (see Section 3). While our main result about vertex cover auctions
(Theorem 16) is with respect to NTUmin = ν, we make use of the new definitions by first comparing
the payment of our mechanism to a weaker bound NTUmax, and then bootstrapping from this result
to obtain the desired bound.
Inspired by this application, we embark on a further study of these payment bounds. Our
results here are as follows:
1. We observe (Proposition 2) that the payment bounds we consider always obey a particular
order that is independent of the choice of the set system and the cost vector, namely, TUmin ≤
NTUmin ≤ NTUmax ≤ TUmax. We provide examples (Proposition 10 and Corollaries 11
and 12) showing that for the vertex cover problem any two consecutive bounds can differ
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by a factor of n − 2, where n is the number of agents. We then show (Theorem 13) that
this separation is almost optimal for general set systems by proving that for any set system
TUmax/TUmin ≤ n. In contrast, we demonstrate (Theorem 14) that for path auctions
TUmax/TUmin ≤ 2. We provide examples (Proposition 4) showing that this bound is tight.
We see this as an argument for the study of vertex-cover auctions, as they appear to be more
representative of the general team-selection problem than the widely studied path auctions.
2. We show (Theorem 5) that for any set system, if there is a cost vector for which TUmin
and NTUmin differ by a factor of α, there is another cost vector that separates NTUmin and
NTUmax by the same factor and vice versa; the same is true for the pairs (NTUmin,NTUmax)
and (NTUmax,TUmax). This result suggests that the four payment bounds should be studied
in a unified framework; moreover, it leads us to believe that the bootstrapping technique of
Theorem 16 may have other applications.
3. We evaluate the payment bounds introduced here with respect to a checklist of desirable
features. In particular, we note that the payment bound ν = NTUmin of [16] exhibits some
counterintuitive properties, such as nonmonotonicity with respect to adding a new feasible set
(Proposition 25), and is NP-hard to compute (Theorem 27), while some of the other payment
bounds do not suffer from these problems. This can be seen as an argument in favour of using
weaker but efficiently computable bounds NTUmax and TUmax.
1.2 Related work on vertex-cover auctions
Vertex-cover auctions have been studied in the past by Talwar [21] and Calinescu [5]. Both of these
papers are based on the definition of frugality ratio used in [1]; as mentioned before, this means
that their results only apply to bipartite graphs. Talwar [21] shows that the frugality ratio of VCG
is at most ∆. However, since finding the cheapest vertex cover is an NP-hard problem, the VCG
mechanism is computationally infeasible. The first (and, to the best of our knowledge, only) paper
to investigate polynomial-time truthful mechanisms for vertex cover is [5]. That paper studies an
auction that is based on the greedy allocation algorithm, which has an approximation ratio of log n.
While the main focus of [5] is the more general set cover problem, the results of [5] imply a frugality
ratio of 2∆2 for vertex cover. Our results improve on those of [21] as our mechanism is polynomial-
time computable, as well as on those of [5], as our mechanism has a better approximation ratio,
and we prove a stronger bound on the frugality ratio; moreover, this bound also applies to the
mechanism of [5].
2 Preliminaries
A set system is a pair (E ,F), where E is the ground set, |E| = n, and F is a collection of feasible
sets, which are subsets of E . Two particular types of set systems are of particular interest to us —
shortest path systems and vertex cover systems. In a shortest path system, the ground set consists
of all edges of a network, and a set of edges is feasible if it contains a path between two specified
vertices s and t. In a vertex cover system, the elements of the ground set are the vertices of a
graph, and the feasible sets are vertex covers of this graph. We will also present some results for
matroid systems, in which the ground set is the set of all elements of a matroid, and the feasible
sets are the bases of the matroid. For a formal definition of a matroid, the reader is referred to [19].
In this paper, we use the following characterisation of a matroid.
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Proposition 1. A collection of feasible sets F is the set of bases of a matroid if and only if for
any Si, Sj ∈ F , there is a bijection f between Si \ Sj and Sj \ Si such that Si \ {e} ∪ {f(e)} ∈ F
for any e ∈ Si \ Sj .
In set system auctions, each element e of the ground set is owned by an independent agent and
has an associated non-negative cost ce. The goal of the buyer is to select (purchase) a feasible set.
Each element e in the selected set incurs a cost of ce. The elements that are not selected incur no
costs.
The auction proceeds as follows: all elements of the ground set make their bids, then the buyer
selects a feasible set based on the bids and makes payments to the agents. Formally, an auction is
defined by an allocation rule A : Rn 7→ F and a payment rule P : Rn 7→ Rn. The allocation rule
takes as input a vector of bids and decides which of the sets in F should be selected. The payment
rule also takes as input a vector of bids and decides how much to pay to each agent. The standard
requirements are individual rationality, that the payment to each agent should be at least as high
as its incurred cost (0 for agents not in the selected set and ce for an agent e in the selected set),
and incentive compatibility, or truthfulness, that each agent’s dominant strategy is to bid its true
cost.
An allocation rule is monotone if an agent cannot increase its chance of getting selected by
raising its bid. Formally, for any bid vector b = (b1, . . . , bn) and any e ∈ E , if e 6∈ A(b) then
e 6∈ A(b1, . . . , b
′
e, . . . , bn) for any b
′
e > be. Given a monotone allocation rule A and a bid vector
b, the threshold bid te of an agent e ∈ A(b) is the highest bid of this agent that still wins the
auction, given that the bids of other participants remain the same. Formally, te = sup{b
′
e ∈ R | e ∈
A(b1, . . . , b
′
e, . . . , bn)}. It is well known (see, e.g. [17, 13]) that any set-system auction that has a
monotone allocation rule and pays each agent its threshold bid is truthful; conversely, any truthful
set-system auction has a monotone allocation rule.
The VCG mechanism is a truthful mechanism that maximises the “social welfare” and pays 0
to the losing agents. For set system auctions, this simply means picking a cheapest feasible set,
paying each agent in the selected set its threshold bid, and paying 0 to all other agents. Note,
however, that the VCG mechanism may be difficult to implement, since finding a cheapest feasible
set may be computationally hard.
If U ⊆ E is a set of agents, c(U) denotes
∑
e∈U ce. (Note that we identify an agent with its
associated member of the ground set.) Similarly, b(U) denotes
∑
e∈U be.
3 Frugality ratios
We start by reproducing the definition of the quantity ν from [16, Definition 4]. Let (E ,F) be a
set system and let S be a cheapest feasible set with respect to the (vector of) true costs c. Then
ν(c, S) is the solution to the following optimisation problem.
Minimise B =
∑
e∈S be subject to
(1) be ≥ ce for all e ∈ S
(2)
∑
e∈S\T be ≤
∑
e∈T\S ce for all T ∈ F
(3) for every e ∈ S, there is Te ∈ F such that e 6∈ Te and
∑
e′∈S\Te
be′ =
∑
e′∈Te\S
ce′
The bound ν(c, S) can be seen as an outcome of a hypothetical two-stage process as follows.
An omniscient auctioneer knows all the vendors’ private costs, and identifies a cheapest set S. The
auctioneer offers payments to the members of S. He does it so as to minimise his total payment
subject to the following constraints that represent a notion of fairness.
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• The payment to any member of S covers that member’s cost. (Condition 1)
• S is still a cheapest set with respect to the new cost vector in which the cost of a member of
S has been increased to his offer. (Condition 2)
• if any member e of S were to ask for a higher payment than his offer, then some other feasible
set (not containing e) would be cheapest. (Condition 3)
This definition captures many important aspects of our intuition about ‘fair’ payments. How-
ever, it can be modified in two ways, both of which are still quite natural, but result in different
payment bounds.
First, we can consider the worst rather than the best possible outcome for the buyer. That
is, we can consider the maximum total payment that the agents can extract by jointly selecting
their bids subject to (1), (2), and (3). Such a bound corresponds to maximising B subject to (1),
(2), and (3) rather than minimising it. If the agents in S submit bids (rather than the auctioneer
making offers), this kind of outcome is plausible. It has to be assumed that agents submit bids
independently of each other, but know how high they can bid and still win. Hence, the difference
between these two definitions can be seen as “the price of initiative”.
Second, the agents may be able to make payments to each other. In this case, if they can extract
more money from the buyer by agreeing on a vector of bids that violates individual rationality (i.e.,
condition (1)) for some bidders, they might be willing to do so, as the agents who are paid below
their costs will be compensated by other members of the group. The bids must still be realistic,
i.e., they have to satisfy be ≥ 0. The resulting change in payments can be seen as “the price of
co-operation” and corresponds to replacing condition (1) with the following weaker condition (1∗):
be ≥ 0 for all e ∈ S. (1
∗)
By considering all possible combinations of these modifications, we obtain four different payment
bounds, namely
• TUmin(c, S), which is the solution to the optimisation problem “Minimise B subject to (1∗),
(2), and (3)”.
• TUmax(c, S), which is the solution to the optimisation problem “Maximise B subject to (1∗),
(2), and (3)”.
• NTUmin(c, S), which is the solution to the optimisation problem “Minimise B subject to (1),
(2), and (3)”.
• NTUmax(c, S), which is the solution to the optimisation problem “Maximise B subject to
(1), (2), (3)”.
The abbreviations TU and NTU correspond, respectively, to transferable utility and non-transferable
utility, i.e., the agents’ ability/inability to make payments to each other. For concreteness, we will
take TUmin(c) to be TUmin(c, S) where S is the lexicographically least amongst the cheapest
feasible sets. We define TUmax(c), NTUmin(c), NTUmax(c) and ν(c) similarly, though we will
see in Section 6.3 that NTUmin(c, S) and NTUmax(c, S) are independent of the choice of S. Note
that the quantity ν(c) from [16] is NTUmin(c).
The second modification (transferable utility) is more intuitively appealing in the context of the
maximisation problem, as both assume some degree of co-operation between the agents. While the
second modification can be made without the first, the resulting payment bound TUmin(c, S) turns
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out to be too strong to be a realistic benchmark, at least for general set systems. In particular,
it can be smaller than the total cost of a cheapest feasible set S (see Section 6). However, we
provide the definition and some results about TUmin(c, S), both for completeness and because we
believe that it may help to understand which properties of the payment bounds are important for
our proofs. Another possibility would be to introduce an additional constraint
∑
e∈S be ≥
∑
e∈S ce
in the definition of TUmin(c, S) (note that this condition holds automatically for non-transferable
utility bounds, and also for TUmax(c, S), as TUmax(c, S) ≥ NTUmax(c, S)). However, such a
definition would have no direct economic interpretation, and some of our results (in particular, the
ones in Section 4) would no longer hold.
Remark 1. For the payment bounds that are derived from maximisation problems, (i.e., TUmax(c, S)
and NTUmax(c, S)), constraints of type (3) are redundant and can be dropped. Hence, TUmax(c, S)
and NTUmax(c, S) are solutions to linear programs, and therefore can be computed in polynomial
time as long as we have a separation oracle for constraints in (2). In contrast, NTUmin(c, S) can
be NP-hard to compute even if the size of F is polynomial (see Section 6).
The first and third inequalities in the following observation follow from the fact that condition
(1∗) is weaker than condition (1).
Proposition 2. TUmin(c, S) ≤ NTUmin(c, S) ≤ NTUmax(c, S) ≤ TUmax(c, S).
Let M be a truthful mechanism for (E ,F). Let pM(c) denote the total payments of M when
the actual costs are c. A frugality ratio ofM with respect to a payment bound is the ratio between
the payment of M and this payment bound. In particular,
φTUmin(M) = sup
c
pM(c)/TUmin(c),
φTUmax(M) = sup
c
pM(c)/TUmax(c),
φNTUmin(M) = sup
c
pM(c)/NTUmin(c),
φNTUmax(M) = sup
c
pM(c)/NTUmax(c).
We conclude this section by showing that there exist set systems and respective cost vectors for
which all four payment bounds are different. In the next section, we quantify this difference, both
for general set systems, and for specific types of set systems, such as path auctions or vertex cover
auctions.
Example 3. Consider the shortest-path auction on the graph of Figure 1. The minimal feasible
sets are all paths from A to D. It can be verified, using the reasoning of Proposition 4 below, that
for the cost vector cAB = cCD = 2, cBC = 1, cAC = cBD = 5, we have
• TUmax(c) = 10 (with the bid vector bAB = bCD = 5, bBC = 0),
• NTUmax(c) = 9 (with the bid vector bAB = bCD = 4, bBC = 1),
• NTUmin(c) = 7 (with the bid vector bAB = bCD = 2, bBC = 3),
• TUmin(c) = 5 (with the bid vector bAB = bCD = 0, bBC = 5).
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4 Comparing payment bounds
4.1 Path auctions
We start by showing that for path auctions any two consecutive payment bounds (in the sequence
of Proposition 2) can differ by at least a factor of 2. In Section 4.4 (Theorem 14), we show that
the separation results in Proposition 4 are optimal (that is, the factor of 2 is maximal for path
auctions).
Proposition 4. There is a path auction and cost vectors c, c′ and c′′ for which
(i) NTUmax(c)/NTUmin(c) ≥ 2,
(ii) TUmax(c′)/NTUmax(c′) ≥ 2,
(iii) NTUmin(c′′)/TUmin(c′′) ≥ 2.
Proof. Consider the graph of Figure 1. For the cost vectors c, c′ and c′′ defined below, ABCD is
the lexicographically-least cheapest path, so we can assume that S = {AB,BC,CD}.
(i) Let c be edge costs cAB = cBC = cCD = 0, cAC = cBD = 1. The inequalities in (2) are
bAB + bBC ≤ cAC = 1, bBC + bCD ≤ cBD = 1. By condition (3), both of these inequalities
must be tight (the former one is the only inequality involving bAB , and the latter one is the
only inequality involving bCD). The inequalities in (1) are bAB ≥ 0, bBC ≥ 0, bCD ≥ 0. Now,
if the goal is to maximise bAB + bBC + bCD, the best choice is bAB = bCD = 1, bBC = 0, so
NTUmax(c) = 2. On the other hand, if the goal is to minimise bAB + bBC + bCD, one should
set bAB = bCD = 0, bBC = 1, so NTUmin(c) = 1.
(ii) Let c′ be the edge costs be c′AB = c
′
CD = 0, c
′
BC = 1, c
′
AC = c
′
BD = 1. The inequalities in (2)
are the same as before, and by the same argument both of them are, in fact, equalities. The
inequalities in (1) are bAB ≥ 0, bBC ≥ 1, bCD ≥ 0. Our goal is to maximise bAB + bBC + bCD.
If we have to respect the inequalities in (1), we have to set bAB = bCD = 0, bBC = 1, so
NTUmax(c) = 1. Otherwise, we can set bAB = bCD = 1, bBC = 0, so TUmax(c) ≥ 2.
(iii) The edge costs c′′ are c′′AB = c
′′
CD = 1, c
′′
BC = 0, c
′′
AC = c
′′
BD = 1. Again, the inequalities in (2)
are the same, and both are, in fact, equalities. The inequalities in (1) are bAB ≥ 1, bBC ≥ 0,
bCD ≥ 1. Our goal is to minimise bAB + bBC + bCD. If we have to respect the inequalities
in (1), we have to set bAB = bCD = 1, bBC = 0, so NTUmin(c) = 2. Otherwise, we can set
bAB = bCD = 0, bBC = 1, so TUmin(c) ≤ 1.
4.2 Connections between separation results
The separation results for path auctions are obtained on the same graph using very similar cost
vectors. It turns out that this is not coincidental. Namely, we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5. For any set system (E ,F), and any feasible set S,
max
c
TUmax(c, S)
NTUmax(c, S)
= max
c
NTUmax(c, S)
NTUmin(c, S)
= max
c
NTUmin(c, S)
TUmin(c, S)
,
where the maximum is over all cost vectors c for which S is a cheapest feasible set.
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The proof of the theorem follows directly from the four lemmas proved below; in particular, the
first equality in Theorem 5 is obtained by combining Lemmas 6 and 7, and the second equality is
obtained by combining Lemmas 8 and 9.
Lemma 6. Suppose that c is a cost vector for (E ,F) such that S is a cheapest feasible set and
TUmax(c, S)/NTUmax(c, S) = α. Then there is a cost vector c′ such that S is a cheapest feasible
set and NTUmax(c′, S)/NTUmin(c′, S) ≥ α.
Proof. Suppose that TUmax(c, S) = X and NTUmax(c, S) = Y where X/Y = α. Assume without
loss of generality that S consists of elements 1, . . . , k, and let b1 = (b11, . . . , b
1
k) and b
2 = (b21, . . . , b
2
k)
be the bid vectors that correspond to TUmax(c, S) and NTUmax(c, S), respectively.
Construct the cost vector c′ by setting c′i = ci for i 6∈ S, c
′
i = min{ci, b
1
i } for i ∈ S. Clearly, S
is a cheapest set under c′. Moreover, as the costs of elements outside of S remain the same, the
right-hand sides of all constraints in (2) and (3) do not change, so any bid vector that satisfies (2)
and (3) with respect to c, also satisfies them with respect to c′. We will construct two bid vectors b3
and b4 that satisfy conditions (1), (2) and (3) for the cost vector c′, and also satisfy
∑
i∈S b
3
i = X,∑
i∈S b
4
i = Y . It follows that NTUmax(c
′, S) ≥ X and NTUmin(c′, S) ≤ Y , which implies the
lemma.
We can set b3 = b1: this bid vector satisfies conditions (2) and (3) since b1 does, and we
have b1i ≥ min{ci, b
1
i } = c
′
i, which means that b
3 satisfies condition (1). We can set b4 = b2.
Again, b4 satisfies conditions (2) and (3) since b2 does, and since b2 satisfies condition (1), we
have b2i ≥ ci ≥ c
′
i, which means that b
4 satisfies condition (1).
Lemma 7. Suppose that c is a cost vector for (E ,F) such that S is a cheapest feasible set and
NTUmax(c, S)/NTUmin(c, S) = α. Then there is a cost vector c′ such that S is a cheapest feasible
set and TUmax(c′, S)/NTUmax(c′, S) ≥ α.
Proof. Suppose that NTUmax(c, S) = X and NTUmin(c, S) = Y where X/Y = α. Again, assume
that S consists of elements 1, . . . , k, and let b1 = (b11, . . . , b
1
k) and b
2 = (b21, . . . , b
2
k) be the bid
vectors that correspond to NTUmax(c, S) and NTUmin(c, S), respectively.
Construct the cost vector c′ by setting c′i = ci for i 6∈ S, c
′
i = b
2
i for i ∈ S. As b
2 satisfies
condition (2), S is a cheapest set under c′. As in the previous construction, the right-hand sides of
all constraints in (2) do not change. Let b3 be a bid vector that corresponds to NTUmax(c′, S). Let
us prove that NTUmax(c′, S) =
∑
i∈S b
3
i = Y . Indeed, the bid vector b
3 must satisfy b3i ≥ c
′
i = b
2
i
for i = 1, . . . , k (condition (1)). Suppose that b3i > c
′
i for some i = 1, . . . , k, and consider the
constraint in (2) that is tight for b2i . There is such a constraint, as b
2 satisfies condition (3).
Namely, for some T not containing i,
∑
j∈S\T
b2j =
∑
j∈T\S
cj .
For every j appearing in the left-side of this constraint, we have b3j ≥ b
2
j but b
3
i > b
2
i , so the bid
vector b3 violates this constraint. Hence, b3i = c
′
i = b
2
i for all i and therefore NTUmax(c
′, S) =∑
i∈S b
3
i = Y .
On the other hand, we can construct a bid vector b4 that satisfies conditions (2) and (3) with
respect to c′ and has
∑
i∈S b
4
i = X. Namely, we can set b
4 = b1: as b1 satisfies conditions (2)
and (3), so does b4. As TUmax(c′, S) ≥
∑
i∈S b
4
i , this proves the lemma.
Lemma 8. Suppose that c is a cost vector for (E ,F) such that S is a cheapest feasible set and
NTUmax(c, S)/NTUmin(c, S) = α. Then there is a cost vector c′ such that S is a cheapest feasible
set and NTUmin(c′, S)/TUmin(c′, S) ≥ α.
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Figure 2: Graph that separates payment bounds for vertex cover, n = 7
Proof. Suppose that NTUmax(c, S) = X and NTUmin(c, S) = Y where X/Y = α. Again, assume
S consists of elements 1, . . . , k, and let b1 = (b11, . . . , b
1
k) and b
2 = (b21, . . . , b
2
k) be the bid vectors
that correspond to NTUmax(c, S) and NTUmin(c, S), respectively.
The cost vector c′ is obtained by setting c′i = ci for i 6∈ S, c
′
i = b
1
i for i ∈ S. Since b
1 satisfies
condition (2), S is a cheapest set under c′, and the right-hand sides of all constraints in (2) do not
change.
Let b3 be a bid vector that corresponds to NTUmin(c′, S). It is easy to see that NTUmin(c′, S) =∑
i∈S b
3
i = X, since the bid vector b
3 must satisfy b3i ≥ c
′
i = b
1
i for i = 1, . . . , k (condition (1)), and∑
i∈S b
1
i = NTUmax(c) = X. On the other hand, we can construct a bid vector b
4 that satisfies
conditions (2) and (3) with respect to c′ and has
∑
i∈S b
4
i = Y . Namely, we can set b
4 = b2: as b2
satisfies conditions (2) and (3), so does b4. As TUmin(c′, S) ≤
∑
i∈S b
4
i , this proves the lemma.
Lemma 9. Suppose that c is a cost vector for (E ,F) such that S is a cheapest feasible set and
NTUmin(c, S)/TUmin(c, S) = α. Then there is a cost vector c′ such that S is a cheapest feasible
set and NTUmax(c′, S)/NTUmin(c′, S) ≥ α.
Proof. Suppose that NTUmin(c, S) = X and TUmin(c, S) = Y where X/Y = α. Again, assume
that S consists of elements 1, . . . , k, and let b1 = (b11, . . . , b
1
k) and b
2 = (b21, . . . , b
2
k) be the bid
vectors that correspond to NTUmin(c, S) and TUmin(c, S), respectively.
Construct the cost vector c′ by setting c′i = ci for i 6∈ S, c
′
i = min{ci, b
2
i } for i ∈ S. Clearly, S
is a cheapest set under c′. Moreover, as the costs of elements outside of S remained the same, the
right-hand sides of all constraints in (2) do not change.
We construct two bid vectors b3 and b4 that satisfy conditions (1), (2), and (3) for the cost
vector c′, and have
∑
i∈S b
3
i = X,
∑
i∈S b
4
i = Y . As NTUmax(c
′, S) ≥ X and NTUmin(c′, S) ≤ Y ,
this implies the lemma.
We can set b3 = b1. Indeed, the vector b3 satisfies conditions (2) and (3) since b1 does. Also,
since b1 satisfies condition (1), we have b1i ≥ ci ≥ c
′
i, i.e., b
3 satisfies condition (1) with respect to
c′. On the other hand, we can set b4 = b2: the vector b4 satisfies conditions (2) and (3) since b2
does, and it satisfies condition (1), since b2i ≥ c
′
i.
4.3 Vertex-cover auctions
In contrast to the case of path auctions, for vertex-cover auctions the gap between NTUmin(c)
and NTUmax(c) (and hence between NTUmax(c) and TUmax(c), and between TUmin(c) and
NTUmin(c)) can be proportional to the size of the graph.
Proposition 10. For any n ≥ 3, there is a an n-vertex graph and a cost vector c for which
TUmax(c)/NTUmax(c) ≥ n− 2.
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Proof. The underlying graph consists of an (n − 1)-clique on the vertices X1, . . . ,Xn−1, and an
extra vertex X0 adjacent to Xn−1. See Figure 2. The costs are cX1 = cX2 = · · · = cXn−2 = 0,
cX0 = cXn−1 = 1. We can assume that S = {X0,X1, . . . ,Xn−2} (this is the lexicographically first
vertex cover of cost 1). For this set system, the constraints in (2) are bXi + bX0 ≤ cXn−1 = 1 for
i = 1, . . . , n−2. Clearly, we can satisfy conditions (2) and (3) by setting bXi = 1 for i = 1, . . . , n−2,
bX0 = 0. Hence, TUmax(c) ≥ n− 2. For NTUmax(c), there is an additional constraint bX0 ≥ 1, so
the best we can do is to set bXi = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n−2, bX0 = 1, which implies NTUmax(c) = 1.
Combining Proposition 10 with Lemmas 6 and 8 (and re-naming vertices to make S the
lexicographically-least cheapest feasible set), we derive the following corollaries.
Corollary 11. For any n ≥ 3, there is an instance of the vertex cover problem on an n-vertex
graph for which for which NTUmax(c)/NTUmin(c) ≥ n− 2.
Corollary 12. For any n ≥ 3, there is an instance of the vertex cover problem on an n-vertex
graph for which NTUmin(c)/TUmin(c) ≥ n− 2.
4.4 Upper bounds
It turns out that the lower bound proved in the previous subsection is almost tight. More pre-
cisely, the following theorem shows that no two payment bounds can differ by more than a factor
of n; moreover, this is the case not just for the vertex cover problem, but for general set sys-
tems. We bound the gap between TUmax(c) and TUmin(c). Since TUmin(c) ≤ NTUmin(c) ≤
NTUmax(c) ≤ TUmax(c), this bound applies to any pair of payment bounds.
Theorem 13. For any set system auction having n vendors and any cost vector c,
TUmax(c)/TUmin(c) ≤ n.
Proof. Let k be the size of the winning set S. Let c1, . . . , ck be the true costs of elements in S, let
b1, . . . , bk be their bids that correspond to TUmin(c), and let b
′
1, . . . , b
′
k be their bids that correspond
to TUmax(c). For e′ ∈ S, let Te′ be the feasible set associated with e
′ using (3) applied to the
TUmin bids.
Since TUmin(c) =
∑
e∈S be, it follows that
kTUmin(c) =
∑
e′∈S
∑
e∈S be
≥
∑
e′∈S
∑
e∈S\Te′
be
=
∑
e′∈S
∑
e∈Te′\S
ce by (3) (applied to TUmin bids)
≥
∑
e′∈S
∑
e∈S\Te′
b′e by (2) (applied to TUmax bids)
≥
∑
e′∈S b
′
e′ since e
′ ∈ S \ Te′
= TUmax(c)
Since k < n the result follows.
Remark 2. The final line of the proof of Theorem 13 shows that, in fact, the upper bound on
TUmax(c)/TUmin(c) can be strengthened to the size of the winning set, k. Note that in Propo-
sition 10, as well as in Corollaries 11 and 12, k = n − 1, so these results do not contradict each
other.
For path auctions, this upper bound can be improved to 2, matching the lower bounds of
Section 4.1.
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Figure 3: Proof of Theorem 14: constraints for Pˆij and Pˆij+2 do not overlap
Theorem 14. For any path auction with cost vector c, TUmax(c)/TUmin(c) ≤ 2.
Proof. Given a network (G, s, t), let P = {e1, . . . , ek} be the lexicographically-least cheapest s–t
path in G. To simplify notation, relabel the vertices of G as {1, . . . , n} so that e1 = (s, 1), e2 =
(1, 2), . . . , ek = (k − 1, t). Let b = (b1, . . . , bk) and b
′ = (b′1, . . . , b
′
k) be bid vectors that correspond
to TUmin(c) and TUmax(c), respectively.
For i = 1, . . . , k let Pi be a s–t path associated with ei by a constraint of type (3) applied to
b; consequently b(P \ Pi) = c(Pi \ P ). We can assume without loss of generality that Pi coincides
with P up to some vertex xi, then deviates from P to avoid ei, and finally returns to P at a vertex
yi and coincides with P from then on (clearly, it might happen that s = xi or t = yi). Indeed, if
Pi deviates from P more than once, one of these deviations is not necessary to avoid ei and can
be replaced with the respective segment of P without increasing the cost of Pi. Among all paths
of this form, let Pˆi be the one with the largest value of yi, i.e., the “rightmost” one. This path
corresponds to an equality Ii of the form bxi+1 + · · ·+ byi = c(Pˆi \ P ).
We construct a set L of equalities such that every variable bi appears in at least one of them.
We construct L inductively as follows. Start by setting L = {I1}. At the jth step, suppose that all
variables up to (but not including) bij appear in at least one equality in L. Add Iij to L.
Note that for any j we have yij+1 > yij . This is because the equalities added to L during the
first j steps did not cover bij+1 . See Figure 3. Since yij+2 > yij+1 , we must also have xij+2 > yij :
otherwise, Pˆij+1 would not be the “rightmost” constraint for bij+1 . Therefore, the variables in Iij+2
and Iij do not overlap, and hence no bi can appear in more than two equalities in L. Hence, adding
up all of the equalities in L (and noting that the bi are non-negative) we obtain
2
∑
i=1,...,k
bi ≥
∑
j : ij∈L
c(Pˆj \ P ).
On the other hand, each equality Ii has a corresponding inequality based on constraint (2) applied
to b′, namely b′xi+1 + · · · + b
′
yi ≤ c(Pˆi \ P ). Summing these inequalities we have
∑
i=1,...,k b
′
i ≤∑
j : ij∈L
c(Pˆj \ P ). The result follows from this and the previous expression.
Finally, we show that for matroids all four payment bounds coincide.
Theorem 15. For any matroid M = (E ,F) with cost vector c, TUmax(c)/TUmin(c) = 1.
Proof. Let S, |S| = k be the lexicographically-least cheapest base of M . We can assume without
loss of generality that S = {e1, . . . , ek}. Let b = (b1, . . . , bk) and b
′ = (b′1, . . . , b
′
k) be bid vectors
that correspond to TUmin(c) and TUmax(c), respectively. For the bid vector b and any ei ∈ S,
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consider a constraint in (2) that is tight for ei and the base S
′ that is associated with this constraint.
Suppose S \S′ = {ei1 , . . . , eit}, i.e., the tight constraint for ei is of the form bi1+ · · ·+bit = c(S
′ \S),
i ∈ {ii1 , . . . , iit}. By Proposition 1 there is a mapping f such that S
′ \ S = {f(ei1), . . . , f(eit)}
and for j = 1, . . . , t the set S \ {eij} ∪ {f(eij )} is a base. Therefore by condition (2) we have
b(eij ) ≤ c(f(eij )) for all j = 1, . . . , t. Consequently, it must be the case that all these constraints
are tight as well, and in particular we have bi = c(f(ei)). On the other hand, as S\{ei}∪{f(ei)} ∈ F ,
we also have b′i ≤ c(f(ei)) = bi. As this holds for any i = 1, . . . , k, we have TUmax(c) ≤ TUmin(c).
Since also TUmin(c) ≤ TUmax(c), the theorem follows.
5 Truthful mechanisms for vertex cover
Recall that for a vertex-cover auction on a graph G = (V,E), an allocation rule is an algorithm
that takes as input a bid bv for each vertex v and returns a vertex cover Sˆ of G. As explained
in Section 2, we can combine any monotone allocation rule with threshold payments to obtain a
truthful auction.
Two natural examples of monotone allocation rules are V CG, which finds an optimal vertex
cover, and the mechanism MGR that uses the greedy allocation algorithm. However, V CG cannot
be guaranteed to run in polynomial time unless P = NP andMGR has a worst-case approximation
ratio of log n.
Another approximation algorithm for (weighted) vertex cover, which has approximation ratio
2, is the local ratio algorithm ALR [2, 3]. This algorithm considers the edges of G one by one.
Given an edge e = (u, v), it computes ǫ = min{bu, bv} and sets bu = bu − ǫ, bv = bv − ǫ. After all
edges have been processed, ALR returns the set of vertices {v | bv = 0}. It is not hard to check
that if the order in which the edges are considered is independent of the bids, then this algorithm
is monotone as well. Hence, we can use it to construct a truthful auction MLR that is guaranteed
to select a vertex cover whose cost is within a factor of 2 from the optimal.
However, while the quality of the solution produced by ALR is much better than that of MGR,
we still need to show that its total payment is not too high. In the next subsection, we bound
the frugality ratio of MLR (and, more generally, all algorithms that satisfy the condition of local
optimality, defined later) by 2∆, where ∆ is the maximum degree of G. We then prove a matching
lower bound showing that for some graphs the frugality ratio of any truthful auction is at least
∆/2.
5.1 Upper bound
For vertices v and w, v ∼ w means that there is an edge between v and w. We say that an allocation
rule is locally optimal if whenever bv >
∑
w∼v bw, the vertex v is not chosen. Note that for any
such rule the threshold bid tv of v satisfies tv ≤
∑
w∼v bw.
Remark 3. The mechanisms V CG, MGR, and MLR are locally optimal.
Theorem 16. Any vertex cover auction M on a graph with maximum degree ∆ that has a locally
optimal and monotone allocation rule and pays each agent its threshold bid has frugality ratio
φNTUmin(M) ≤ 2∆.
To prove Theorem 16, we first show that the total payment of any locally optimal mechanism
does not exceed ∆c(V ). We then demonstrate that NTUmin(c) ≥ c(V )/2. By combining these two
results, the theorem follows.
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Lemma 17. Let G = (V,E) be a graph with maximum degree ∆. Let M be a vertex-cover auction
on G that satisfies the conditions of Theorem 16. Then for any cost vector c, the total payment of
M satisfies pM(c) ≤ ∆c(V ).
Proof. First note that any such auction is truthful, so we can assume that each agent’s bid is equal
to its cost. Let Sˆ be the vertex cover selected by M. Then by local optimality
pM(c) =
∑
v∈Sˆ
tv ≤
∑
v∈Sˆ
∑
w∼v
bw =
∑
v∈Sˆ
∑
w∼v
cw ≤
∑
w∈V
∆cw = ∆c(V ).
We now derive a lower bound on TUmax(c); while not essential for the proof of Theorem 16, it
helps us build the intuition necessary for that proof.
Lemma 18. For a vertex cover instance G = (V,E) in which S is a minimum-cost vertex cover
with respect to cost vector c, TUmax(c, S) ≥ c(V \ S).
Proof. For a vertex w with at least one neighbour in S, let d(w) denote the number of neighbours
that w has in S. Consider the bid vector b in which, for each v ∈ S, bv =
∑
w∼v,w 6∈S cw/d(w).
Then
∑
v∈S bv =
∑
v∈S
∑
w∼v,w 6∈S cw/d(w) =
∑
w/∈S cw = c(V \ S). To finish we want to show that
b is feasible in the sense that it satisfies (2). Consider a vertex cover T , and extend the bid vector
b by assigning bv = cv for v /∈ S. Then
b(T ) = c(T \ S) + b(S ∩ T ) ≥ c(T \ S) +
∑
v∈S∩T
∑
w∈S∩T :w∼v
cw/d(w),
and since all edges between S ∩ T and S go to S ∩ T , the right-hand-side is equal to
c(T \ S) +
∑
w∈S∩T
cw = c(T \ S) + c(S ∩ T ) = c(V \ S) = b(S).
Next, we prove a lower bound on NTUmax(c, S); we will then use it to obtain a lower bound
on NTUmin(c).
Lemma 19. For a vertex cover instance G = (V,E) in which S is a minimum-cost vertex cover
with respect to cost vector c, NTUmax(c, S) ≥ c(V \ S).
Proof. If c(S) ≥ c(V \ S), by condition (1) we are done. Therefore, for the rest of the proof
we assume that c(S) < c(V \ S). We show how to construct a bid vector (be)e∈S that satisfies
conditions (1) and (2) such that b(S) ≥ c(V \ S); clearly, this implies NTUmax(c, S) ≥ c(V \ S).
Recall that a network flow problem is described by a directed graph Γ = (VΓ, EΓ), a source
node s ∈ VΓ, a sink node t ∈ VΓ, and a vector of capacity constraints ae, e ∈ EΓ. Consider a
network (VΓ, EΓ) such that VΓ = V ∪ {s, t}, EΓ = E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E3, where E1 = {(s, v) | v ∈ S},
E2 = {(v,w) | v ∈ S,w ∈ V \ S, (v,w) ∈ E}, E3 = {(w, t) | w ∈ V \ S}. Since S is a vertex cover
for G, no edge of E can have both of its endpoints in V \ S, and by construction, E2 contains no
edges with both endpoints in S. Therefore, the graph (V,E2) is bipartite with parts (S, V \ S).
Set the capacity constraints for e ∈ EΓ as follows: a(s,v) = cv, a(w,t) = cw, a(v,w) = +∞ for all
v ∈ S, w ∈ V \S. Recall that a cut is a partition of the vertices in VΓ into two sets C1 and C2 so that
s ∈ C1, t ∈ C2; we denote such a cut by C = (C1, C2). Abusing notation, we write e = (u, v) ∈ C
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Figure 4: Proof of Lemma 19. Dashed lines correspond to edges in E \E2
if u ∈ C1, v ∈ C2 or u ∈ C2, v ∈ C1, and say that such an edge e = (u, v) crosses the cut C. The
capacity of a cut C is computed as cap(C) =
∑
(v,w)∈C a(v,w). We have cap(s, V ∪ {t}) = c(S),
cap({s} ∪ V, t) = c(V \ S).
Let Cmin = ({s}∪S
′ ∪W ′, {t}∪S′′ ∪W ′′) be a minimum cut in Γ, where S′, S′′ ⊆ S, W ′,W ′′ ⊆
V \S. See Figure 4. As cap(Cmin) ≤ cap(s, V ∪{t}) = c(S) < +∞, and any edge in E2 has infinite
capacity, no edge (u, v) ∈ E2 crosses Cmin.
Consider the network Γ′ = (VΓ′ , EΓ′), where VΓ′ = {s} ∪ S
′ ∪W ′ ∪ {t}, EΓ′ = {(u, v) ∈ EΓ |
u, v ∈ VΓ′}. Clearly, C
′ = ({s} ∪S′ ∪W ′, {t}) is a minimum cut in Γ′ (otherwise, there would exist
a smaller cut for Γ). As cap(C ′) = c(W ′), we have c(S′) ≥ c(W ′).
Now, consider the network Γ′′ = (VΓ′′ , EΓ′′), where VΓ′′ = {s} ∪ S
′′ ∪W ′′ ∪ {t}, EΓ′′ = {(u, v) ∈
EΓ | u, v ∈ VΓ′′}. Similarly, C
′′ = ({s}, S′′ ∪W ′′ ∪ {t}) is a minimum cut in Γ′′, cap(C ′′) = c(S′′).
As the size of a maximum flow from s to t is equal to the capacity of a minimum cut separating s
and t, there exists a flow F = (fe)e∈EΓ′′ of size c(S
′′). This flow has to saturate all edges between s
and S′′, i.e., f(s,v) = cv for all v ∈ S
′′. Now, increase the capacities of all edges between s and S′′ to
+∞. In the modified network, the capacity of a minimum cut (and hence the size of a maximum
flow) is c(W ′′), and a maximum flow F ′ = (f ′e)e∈EΓ′′ can be constructed by greedily augmenting F .
Set bv = cv for all v ∈ S
′, bv = f
′
(s,v) for all v ∈ S
′′. As F ′ is constructed by augmenting F , we
have bv ≥ cv for all v ∈ S, i.e., condition (1) is satisfied.
Now, let us check that no vertex cover T ⊆ V can violate condition (2). Set T1 = T ∩ S
′,
T2 = T∩S
′′, T3 = T∩W
′, T4 = T∩W
′′; our goal is to show that b(S′\T1)+b(S
′′\T2) ≤ c(T3)+c(T4).
Consider all edges (u, v) ∈ E such that u ∈ S′ \ T1. If (u, v) ∈ E2 then v ∈ T3 (no edge in E2
can cross the cut), and if u, v ∈ S then v ∈ T1 ∪ T2. Hence, T1 ∪ T3 ∪ S
′′ is a vertex cover
for G, and therefore c(T1) + c(T3) + c(S
′′) ≥ c(S) = c(T1) + c(S
′ \ T1) + c(S
′′). Consequently,
c(T3) ≥ c(S
′ \ T1) = b(S
′ \ T1). Now, consider the vertices in S
′′ \ T2. Any edge in E2 that starts
in one of these vertices has to end in T4 (this edge has to be covered by T , and it cannot go
across the cut). Therefore, the total flow out of S′′ \ T2 is at most the total flow out of T4, i.e.,
b(S′′ \ T2) ≤ c(T4). Hence, b(S
′ \ T1) + b(S
′′ \ T2) ≤ c(T3) + c(T4).
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Finally, we derive a lower bound on the payment bound that is of interest to us, namely,
NTUmin(c).
Lemma 20. For a vertex cover instance G = (V,E) in which S is a minimum-cost vertex cover
with respect to cost vector c, NTUmin(c, S) ≥ c(V \ S).
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that c is a cost vector with minimum-cost vertex cover S and
NTUmin(c, S) < c(V \ S). Let b be the corresponding bid vector and let c′ be a new cost vector
with c′v = bv for v ∈ S and c
′
v = cv for v 6∈ S. Condition (2) guarantees that S is an optimal
solution to the cost vector c′. Now compute a bid vector b′ corresponding to NTUmax(c′, S). We
claim that b′v = c
′
v for any v ∈ S. Indeed, suppose that b
′
v > c
′
v for some v ∈ S (b
′
v = c
′
v for
v 6∈ S by construction). As b satisfies conditions (1)–(3), among the inequalities in (2) there is one
that is tight for v and the bid vector b. That is, b(S \ T ) = c(T \ S). By the construction of c′,
c′(S\T ) = c′(T \S). Now since b′w ≥ c
′
w for all w ∈ S, b
′
v > c
′
v implies b
′(S\T ) > c′(S\T ) = c′(T \S).
But this violates (2). So we now know b′ = c′. Hence, we have NTUmax(c′, S) =
∑
v∈S bv =
NTUmin(c, S) < c(V \S), giving a contradiction to the fact that NTUmax(c′, S) ≥ c′(V \S) which
we proved in Lemma 19.
As NTUmin(c, S) satisfies condition (1), we have NTUmin(c, S) ≥ c(S). Together will Lemma 20,
this implies NTUmin(c, S) ≥ max{c(V \S), c(S)} ≥ c(V )/2. Combined with Lemma 17, this com-
pletes the proof of Theorem 16.
Remark 4. As NTUmin(c) ≤ NTUmax(c) ≤ TUmax(c), our bound of 2∆ extends to the smaller
frugality ratios that we consider, i.e., φNTUmax(M) and φTUmax(M). It is not clear whether it
extends to the larger frugality ratio φTUmin(M). However, the frugality ratio φTUmin(M) is not
realistic because the payment bound TUmin(c) is inappropriately low—we show in Section 6 that
TUmin(c) can be significantly smaller than the total cost of a cheapest vertex cover.
Extensions
We can also apply our results to monotone vertex-cover algorithms that do not necessarily output
locally-optimal solutions. To do so, we simply take the vertex cover produced by any such algorithm
and transform it into a locally-optimal one, considering the vertices in lexicographic order and
replacing a vertex v with its neighbours whenever bv >
∑
u∼v bu. Note that if a vertex u gets added
to the vertex cover during this process, it means that it has a neighbour whose bid is higher than
u’s bid bu, so after one pass all vertices in the vertex cover satisfy bv ≤
∑
u∼v bu. This procedure
is monotone in bids, and it can only decrease the cost of the vertex cover. Therefore, using it
on top of a monotone allocation rule with approximation ratio α, we obtain a monotone locally-
optimal allocation rule with approximation ratio α. Combining it with threshold payments, we get
an auction with φNTUmin ≤ 2∆. Since any truthful auction has a monotone allocation rule, this
procedure transforms any truthful mechanism for the vertex-cover problem into a frugal one while
preserving the approximation ratio.
5.2 Lower bound
In this subsection, we prove that the upper bound of Theorem 16 is essentially optimal. Our proof
uses the techniques of [9], where the authors prove a similar result for shortest-path auctions.
Theorem 21. For any ∆ > 0, there exists a graph G with 2∆ vertices and degree ∆, such that for
any truthful mechanism M on G we have φNTUmin(M) ≥ ∆/2.
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Proof. Let G be a complete bipartite graph with parts L and R, |L| = |R| = ∆, thus G has degree
∆.
We consider two families of cost vectors for G. Under a cost vector x ∈ X, G has one vertex of
cost 1; all other vertices cost 0. Under a cost vector y ∈ Y , each of L and R has one vertex of cost
1, and all other vertices have cost 0. Clearly, |X| = 2∆, |Y | = ∆2. We construct a bipartite graph
W with the vertex set X ∪ Y as follows.
Consider a cost vector y ∈ Y ; let its cost-1 vertices be vl ∈ L and vr ∈ R. By changing the
cost of either of these vertices to 0, we obtain a cost vector in X. Let xl and xr be the cost vectors
obtained by changing the cost of vl and vr, respectively. The vertex cover chosen by M(y) must
either contain all vertices in L or all vertices in R. In the former case, we add to W an edge from
y to xl and in the latter case we add to W an edge from y to xr (if the vertex cover includes all of
G, W contains both of these edges).
The graph W has at least ∆2 edges, so there must exist an x ∈ X of degree at least ∆/2. Let
y1, . . . ,y∆/2 be the other endpoints of the edges incident to x, and for each i = 1, . . . ,∆/2, let vi
be the vertex of G whose cost is different under x and yi; note that all vi are distinct.
It is not hard to see that NTUmin(x) ≤ 1: the cheapest vertex cover contains the all-0 part of
G, and we can satisfy conditions (1)–(3) by allowing one of the vertices in the all-0 part of each
block to bid 1, while all other vertices in the cheapest set bid 0.
On the other hand, by monotonicity of M we have vi ∈ M(x) for i = 1, . . . ,∆/2 (vi is in the
winning set under yi, and x is obtained from yi by decreasing the cost of vi), and moreover, the
threshold bid of each vi is at least 1, so the total payment of M on x is at least ∆/2. Hence,
φNTUmin(M) ≥M(x)/NTUmin(x) ≥ ∆/2.
Remark 5. Theorem 21 can be extended to apply to graphs with degree ∆ of unlimited size: a
similar argument applies to any graph made up of multiple copies of the bipartite graph G in the
proof. The resulting lower bound is still ∆/2, i.e., it does not depend on the size of the graph.
Remark 6. The lower bound of Theorem 21 can be generalised to randomised mechanisms, where
a randomised mechanism is considered to be truthful if it can be represented as a probability dis-
tribution over truthful mechanisms. In this case, instead of choosing the vertex x ∈ X with the
highest degree, we put both (y,xl) and (y,xr) into W , label each edge with the probability that the
respective part of the block is chosen, and pick x ∈ X with the highest weighted degree.
6 Properties of the payment bounds
In this section we consider several desirable properties of payment bounds and evaluate the four
payment bounds proposed in this paper with respect to them. The particular properties that we are
interested in are the relationship with other reasonable bounds, such as the total cost of the cheapest
set S (Section 6.1), or the total VCG payment (Section 6.2). We also consider independence of the
choice of S (Section 6.3), monotonicity (Section 6.4.1), computational tractability (Section 6.4.2).
6.1 Comparison with total cost of winning set
The basic property of individual rationality dictates that the total payment must be at least the
total cost of the selected winning set. In this section we show that amongst the payment bounds
we consider here, TUmin(c) may be less than the cost of the winning set S. For such set systems,
TUmin(c) may as a result be too low to be realistic.
Clearly, NTUmax(c) and NTUmin(c) are at least the cost of S due to condition (1), and so is
TUmax(c), since TUmax(c) ≥ NTUmax(c). However, TUmin(c) fails this test. The example of
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Proposition 4 (part (iii)) shows that for path auctions, TUmin(c) can be smaller than the total cost
by a factor of 2. Moreover, there are set systems and cost vectors for which TUmin(c) is smaller
than the cost of the cheapest set S by a factor of Ω(n). Consider, for example, the vertex-cover
auction for the graph of Proposition 10 with the costs cX1 = · · · = cXn−2 = cXn−1 = 1, cX0 = 0.
The cost of a cheapest vertex cover is n−2, and the lexicographically first vertex cover of cost n−2
is {X0,X1, . . . ,Xn−2}. The constraints in (2) are bXi + bX0 ≤ cXn−1 = 1. Clearly, we can satisfy
conditions (2) and (3) by setting bX1 = · · · = bXn−2 = 0, bX0 = 1, which means that TUmin(c) ≤ 1.
This example suggests that the payment bound TUmin(c) is sometimes too strong to be realistic,
since it can be substantially lower than the cost of a cheapest feasible set.
Note, however, that this is not an issue for matroid auctions becuase, for matroids, all four
payment bounds have the same value. The paper [16] shows that if the feasible sets are the bases
of a monopoly-free matroid, then φNTUmin(VCG) = 1. It is not difficult to see that this is also the
case for other payment bounds.
Claim 22. For any monopoly-free matroid, we have
φTUmin(VCG) = φTUmax(VCG) = φNTUmax(VCG) = φNTUmin(VCG) = 1.
Proof. The claim follows immediately from Theorem 15. Alternatively, it is not hard to check that
the argument used in [16] for NTUmin(c) does not use condition (1) at all and hence it works for
TUmin(c) as well.
6.2 Comparison with VCG payments
Another measure of suitability for payment bounds is that they should not result in frugality ratios
that are less then 1 for well-known truthful mechanisms1. If this is indeed the case, the payment
bound may be too weak, as it becomes too easy to design mechanisms that perform well with
respect to it. It particular, a reasonable requirement is that a payment bound should not exceed
the total payment of the classical VCG mechanism.
The following proposition shows that NTUmax(c), and therefore also NTUmin(c) and TUmin(c),
do not exceed the VCG payment pVCG(c). The proof essentially follows the argument of Proposition
7 of [16].
Proposition 23. For any set-system auction, φNTUmax(VCG) ≥ 1.
Proof. Let S be a winning set chosen by VCG (hence, a cheapest set). Suppose e ∈ S. The VCG
payment pe is minT :e/∈T {ce+ c(T )− c(S)}. Let Te be a feasible set T which achieves the minimum,
so pe = c(Te) − c(S \ {e}). But constraint (2) gives b(S \ T ) ≤ c(T \ S) for all T , so since e /∈ Te,
be + b((S \ Te) \ {e}) ≤ c(Te \ S), so
be ≤ c(Te \ S)− b((S \ Te) \ {e}). (4)
Now by constraint (1), b((S \ Te) \ {e}) ≥ c((S \ Te) \ {e}), so (4) gives
be ≤ c(Te \ S)− c((S \ Te) \ {e})
= c(Te \ S) + c(Te ∩ S)− c((S \ Te) \ {e}) − c(Te ∩ S)
≤ c(Te)− c(S \ {e})
= pe.
Thus, every winner’s payment is at least his bid, so the result follows.
1It is too much to ask that they do not result in frugality ratios that are less than 1 for all mechanisms, since this
can typically be subverted by artificial mechanisms.
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Proposition 23 shows that none of the payment bounds TUmin(c), NTUmin(c) and NTUmax(c)
exceeds the payment of VCG. However, the payment bound TUmax(c) can be larger that the total
VCG payment. In particular, for the instance in Proposition 10, the VCG payment is smaller than
TUmax(c) by a factor of n− 2. We have already seen that TUmax(c) ≥ n− 2. On the other hand,
under VCG, the threshold bid of any Xi, i = 1, . . . , n − 2, is 0: if any such vertex bids above 0, it
is deleted from the winning set together with X0 and replaced with Xn−1. Similarly, the threshold
bid of X0 is 1, because if X0 bids above 1, it can be replaced with Xn−1. So the VCG payment
is 1.
This result is not surprising: the definition of TUmax(c) implicitly assumes there is co-operation
between the agents, while the computation of VCG payments does not take into account any
interaction between them. Indeed, co-operation enables the agents to extract higher payments
under VCG. That is, VCG is not group-strategyproof. This suggests that as a payment bound,
TUmax(c) may be too liberal, at least in a context where there is little or no co-operation between
agents. Perhaps TUmax(c) can be a good benchmark for measuring the performance of mechanisms
designed for agents that can form coalitions or make side payments to each other, in particular,
group-strategyproof mechanisms.
Another setting in which bounding φTUmax is still of some interest is when, for the underlying
problem, the optimal allocation and VCG payments are NP-hard to compute. In this case, finding
a polynomial-time computable mechanism with good frugality ratio with respect to TUmax(c) is
a non-trivial task, while bounding the frugality ratio with respect to more challenging payment
bounds could be too difficult. To illustrate this point, compare the proofs of Lemma 18 and
Lemma 19: both require some effort, but the latter is much more difficult than the former.
6.3 The choice of S
All payment bounds defined in this paper correspond to the total bid of all elements in a cheapest
feasible set, where ties are broken lexicographically. While this definition ensures that our payment
bounds are well-defined, the particular choice of the draw-resolution rule appears arbitrary, and
one might ask whether our payment bounds are sufficiently robust to be independent of this choice.
It turns out that is indeed the case for NTUmin(c) and NTUmax(c).
Proposition 24. The values of NTUMinS and NTUmax(c, S) do not depend on the choice of S.
Proof. Consider two feasible sets S1 and S2 that have the same cost. In the computation of
NTUmin(c, S1), all vertices in S1 \ S2 would have to bid their true cost, since otherwise S2 would
become cheaper than S1. Hence, any bid vector for S1 can only have be 6= ce for e ∈ S1 ∩ S2, and
hence constitutes a valid bid vector for S2 (in the context of NTUmin(c, S2)) and vice versa. A
similar argument applies to NTUmax(c).
However, for TUmin(c) and TUmax(c) this is not the case. For example, consider the set
system
E = {e1, e2, e3, e4, e5},F = {S1 = {e1, e2}, S2 = {e2, e3, e4}, S3 = {e4, e5}}
with the costs c1 = 2, c2 = c3 = c4 = 1, c5 = 3. The cheapest sets are S1 and S2. Now
TUmax(c, S1) ≤ 4, as the total bid of the elements in S1 cannot exceed the total cost of S3. On the
other hand, TUmax(c, S2) ≥ 5, as we can set b2 = 3, b3 = 0, b4 = 2. Similarly, TUmin(c, S1) = 4,
because the equalities in (3) are b1 = 2 and b1 + b2 = 4. But TUmin(c, S2) ≤ 3, since we can set
b2 = 1, b3 = 2, b4 = 0.
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Figure 5: Nonmonotonicity of NTUmin(c) for path auctions
6.4 Negative results for NTUmin(c) and TUmin(c)
The results in [16] and our vertex cover results are proved for the frugality ratio φNTUmin. Indeed, it
can be argued that φNTUmin is the “best” definition of frugality ratio, because among those payment
bounds that are at least as large as the cost of a cheapest feasible set, it is most demanding of the
algorithm. However, NTUmin(c) is not always the easiest or the most natural payment bound to
work with. In this subsection, we discuss several disadvantages of NTUmin(c) (and also TUmin(c))
as compared with NTUmax(c) and TUmax(c).
6.4.1 Nonmonotonicity
2
The first problem with NTUmin(c) is that it is not monotone with respect to F , in that it may
increase when one adds a feasible set to F . (It is, however, monotone in the sense that a losing agent
cannot become a winner by raising its cost.) Intuitively, a good payment bound should satisfy this
monotonicity requirement, as adding a feasible set increases the competition, so it should drive the
prices down. Note that this is indeed the case for NTUmax(c) and TUmax(c) since a new feasible
set adds a constraint in (2), thus limiting the solution space for the respective linear program (recall
Remark 1).
Proposition 25. Adding a feasible set to F can increase NTUmin(c) and TUmin(c) by a factor
of Ω(n), where n is the number of agents.
Proof. Let E = {x, x′, y1, . . . , yn, z1, . . . , zn}. Let Y = {y1, . . . , yn}, S = Y ∪{x}, Ti = Y \{yi}∪{zi},
i = 1, . . . , n, and suppose that F = {S, T1, . . . , Tn}. The costs are cx = 0, cx′ = 0, cyi = 0, czi = 1
for i = 1, . . . , n. Note that S is a cheapest feasible set. For F , the bid vector by1 = · · · = byn = 0,
bx = 1 satisfies (1), (2), and (3), so TUmin(c) ≤ NTUmin(c) ≤ 1.
Let S′ = Y ∪{x′}. For F ∪{S′}, S is still the lexicographically-least cheapest set. Any optimal
solution has bx = 0 (by constraint in (2) with S
′). Condition (3) for yi implies bx + byi = czi = 1,
so byi = 1 and NTUmin(c) = n. As all constraints in (1) are of the form be ≥ 0, we also have
TUmin(c) = n.
For path auctions, it has been shown [6] that NTUmin(c) is non-monotone in a slightly different
sense, i.e., with respect to adding a new edge (agent) rather than a new feasible set (a team of
existing agents). We present that example here for completeness.
Proposition 26. For shortest path auctions, adding an edge to the graph can increase NTUmin(c)
by a factor of 2.
2 Simultaneously and independently of our work, Chen and Karlin [6] studied the issue of nonmonotonicity of
NTUmin(c) in much more detail. While some of our results on NTUmin(c) are subsumed by their work, we present
our results here as we feel that they are relevant in the context of this paper, and furthermore, they also apply to
TUmin(c).
19
Proof. Consider the graph of Figure 1 with the edge costs cAB = cBC = cCD = 0, cAC = cBD = 1.
In this graph, ABCD is the cheapest path, and it is easy to see that NTUmin(c) = 1 with the bid
vector bAB = bCD = 0, bBC = 1. Now suppose that we add a new edge B̂C of cost 0 between B
and C, obtaining the graph of Figure 5. We can assume that the original shortest path ABCD
is the lexicographically first shortest path in the new graph, so it gets selected. However, now we
have a new constraint in (2), namely, bBC ≤ cdBC = 0, so we have NTUmin(c) = 2 with the bid
vector bAB = bCD = 1, bBC = 0.
Remark 7. It is not hard to modify the example of Proposition 26 so that the underlying graph
has no multiple edges. Also, as all constraints in (1) are of the form be ≥ 0, it also applies to
TUmin(c).
Remark 8. We can also show that NTUmin(c) and TUmin(c) are non-monotone for vertex cover.
In this case, adding a new feasible set corresponds to deleting edges from the graph. It turns out that
deleting a single edge can increase NTUmin(c) and TUmin(c) by a factor of n−2; the construction
is based on the graph and the cost vector used in Proposition 10.
6.4.2 NP-Hardness
Another problem with NTUmin(c, S) is that it is NP-hard to compute, even if the number of
feasible sets is polynomial in n. Again, this puts it at a disadvantage compared to NTUmax(c, S)
and TUmax(c, S) (see Remark 1).
Theorem 27. Computing NTUmin(c) is NP-hard, even when the lexicographically-least cheapest
feasible set S is given in the input.
Proof. We reduce Exact cover by 3-sets(X3C) to our problem. An instance of X3C is given
by a universe G = {g1, . . . , gn} and a collection of subsets C1, . . . , Cm, Ci ⊂ G, |Ci| = 3, where the
goal is to decide whether one can cover G by n/3 of these sets. Observe that if this is indeed the
case, then each element of G is contained in exactly one set of the cover.
Lemma 28. Consider a minimisation problem P of the following form:
Minimise
∑
i=1,...,n bi under conditions
(1) bi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n
(2)
∑
i∈Sj
bi ≤ aj for j = 1, . . . , k; subsets Sj ⊆ {1, . . . , n}
(3) for each bj, one of the constraints in (2) involving it is tight.
For any such P, one can construct in polynomial time a set system and a vector of costs c such
that NTUmin(c) is the optimal solution to P.
Proof. The construction is straightforward: there is an element ei of cost 0 for each bi, an element
e′j of cost aj for each aj , the feasible solutions are {e1, . . . , en}, or any set obtained from {e1, . . . , en}
by replacing the elements indexed by Sj, with e
′
j .
By this lemma, all we have to do to prove Theorem 27 is to show how to solve X3C by using
the solution to a minimisation problem of the form given in Lemma 28. We do this as follows. For
each Ci, we introduce 4 variables xi, x¯i, ai, and bi. Also, for each element gj of G there is a variable
dj . We use the following set of constraints:
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• In (1), we have constraints xi ≥ 0, x¯i ≥ 0, ai ≥ 0, bi ≥ 0, dj ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . ,m,
j = 1, . . . , n.
• In (2), for all i = 1, . . . ,m, we have the following 5 constraints:
xi + x¯i ≤ 1
xi + ai ≤ 1
x¯i + ai ≤ 1
xi + bi ≤ 1
x¯i + bi ≤ 1.
Also, for all j = 1, . . . , n we have the constraint dj +
∑
i : gj∈Ci
xi ≤ 1.
The goal is to minimize Z =
∑
i(xi + x¯i + ai + bi) +
∑
j dj .
Observe that for each j, there is only one constraint involving dj , so by condition (3) it must
be tight.
Consider the two constraints involving ai. One of them must be tight; either xi + ai = 1 or
x¯i+ ai = 1. It follows that x1+ x¯i+ ai+ bi ≥ 1. Hence, for any feasible solution to (1)–(3) we have
Z ≥ m. Now, suppose that there is an exact set cover. Set dj = 0 for j = 1, . . . , n. Also, if Ci is
included in this cover, set xi = 1, x¯i = ai = bi = 0, otherwise set x¯i = 1, xi = ai = bi = 0. Clearly,
all inequalities in (2) are satisfied (we use the fact that each element is covered exactly once), and
for each variable, one of the constraints involving it is tight. This assignment results in Z = m.
Conversely, suppose there is a feasible solution with Z = m. As each addend of the form
xi + x¯i + ai + bi contributes at least 1, we have xi + x¯i + ai + bi = 1 for all i, dj = 0 for all
j. We will now show that for each i, either xi = 1 and x¯i = 0, or xi = 0 and x¯i = 1. For the
sake of contradiction, suppose that xi = δ < 1, x¯i = δ
′ < 1. As one of the constraints involving
ai must be tight, we have ai ≥ min{1 − δ, 1 − δ
′}. Similarly, bi ≥ min{1 − δ, 1 − δ
′}. Hence,
xi + x¯i + ai + bi ≥ δ + δ
′ + 2min{1− δ, 1− δ′} > 1. This contradicts the previously noted equality
xi + x¯i + ai + bi = 1.
To finish the proof, note that for each j = 1, . . . , n we have xi1 + · · ·+ xik + dj = 1 and dj = 0,
so the subsets that correspond to xi = 1 constitute a set cover.
Remark 9. In the proofs of Theorem 27 all constraints in (1) are of the form be ≥ 0. Hence, the
same result is true for TUmin(c).
Remark 10. For shortest-path auctions, the size of F can be superpolynomial. However, there
is a polynomial-time separation oracle for constraints in (2) (to construct one, use any algorithm
for finding shortest paths), so one can compute NTUmax(c) and TUmax(c) in polynomial time.
On the other hand, recently and independently it was shown [6] that computing NTUmin(c) for
shortest-path auctions is NP-hard.
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A Nash equilibria and frugality ratios
Karlin et al. [16], argue that the payment bound ν can be viewed as the total payment in a
Nash equilibrium of a certain game. In this section, we build on this intuition to justify the four
payment bounds introduced above. We consider two variants of a game that differ in how profit is
shared between the winning players. We will call these variants the TU game and the NTU game
(standing for “transferable utility” and “non-transferable utility” respectively). We then show that
NTUmax(c) and NTUmin(c) correspond to the worst and the best Nash equilibrium of the NTU
game, and TUmax(c) and TUmin(c) correspond to the worst and the best Nash equilibrium of the
TU game. NTUmin(c) corresponds to the payment bound ν of [16].
In both versions, the players are the elements of the ground set E . Each player has an associated
cost that is known to all parties. The game starts by the buyer selecting a cheapest feasible set
S ∈ F (with respect to the true costs), resolving ties lexicographically. Then the elements of S are
allowed to make bids, and the buyer decides whether or not to accept them. Intuitively, S ought to
be able to win the auction, and we seek bids from S that are low enough to win, and high enough
that no member of S has an incentive to raise his bid (because that would cause him to lose).
Given that S is supposed to win, we modify the game to rule out behaviour such as elements
of S bidding unnecessarily high and losing. One way to enforce the requirement that S wins is via
fines. If S is not among the cheapest sets with respect to the bids (where the new cost of a set
T is the sum of the total cost of T \ S and the total bid of T ∩ S), the buyer rejects the solution
and every element of S who bids above its true cost pays a fine of size C = maxe∈E ce, while other
elements pay 0. Otherwise, members of S are paid their bids (which may then be shared amongst
members of S). This ensures that in a Nash equilibrium, the resulting bids are never rejected as a
result of S not being the cheapest feasible set.
In the NTU game, we assume that players cannot make payments to each other, i.e., the utility
of each player in S is exactly the difference between his bid and his true cost. In particular, this
means that no agent will bid below his true cost, which is captured by condition (1). In a Nash
equilibrium, S is the cheapest set with respect to the bids, which is captured by condition (2).
Now, suppose that condition (3) is not satisfied for some bidder e. Then the vector of bids is not a
Nash equilibrium: e can benefit from increasing his bids by a small amount. Conversely, any vector
of bids that satisfies (1), (2) and (3) is a Nash equilibrium: no player wants to decrease its bid, as
it would lower the payment it receives, and no player can increase its bid, as it would violate (2)
and will cause this bidder to pay a fine. As NTUmin(c) minimises
∑
e∈S be under conditions (1),
(2), and (3), and NTUmax(c) maximises it, these are, respectively, the best and the worst Nash
equilibrium, from the buyer’s point of view.
In the TU game, the players in S redistribute the profits among themselves in equal shares, i.e.,
each player’s utility is the difference between the total payment to S and the total cost of S, divided
by the size of S. We noted in Section 6.1 that when S is required to be the winning set, this may
result in Nash equilibria where members of S make a loss collectively, and not just individually as a
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result of condition (1) not applying. (Recall that we do assume that agents’ bids are non-negative;
condition (1∗).) TUmin(c) thus represents a situation in which “winners” are being coerced into
accepting a loss-making contract.
TUmax(c) does not have the above problem, since it is larger than the other payment bounds,
so members of S will not make a loss. The meaning of conditions (2) and (3) remains the same:
the agents do not want the buyer to reject their bid, and no agent can improve the total payoff
by raising their bid. Note that we are not allowing coalitions (see remark 11), i.e., coordinated
deviations by two or more players: even though the players share the profits, they cannot make joint
decisions about their strategies. Similarly to the NTU game, it is easy to see that TUmax(c) and
TUmin(c) are, respectively, the worst and the best Nash equilibria of this game from the buyer’s
viewpoint.
Remark 11. Allowing payment redistribution within a set is different from allowing players to
form coalitions (as in, e.g., the definition of strong Nash equilibrium): in the latter case, players
are allowed to make joint decisions about their bids, but they cannot make payments to each other.
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